The Cuban Conundrum

In the aftermath of the 2014 off-year elections, where the Republican Party gained control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, President Obama announced an unexpected initiative to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba . . . with “Castro’s Cuba” as it is almost always referred to in the press. “In the most significant changes in our policy in more than 50 years,” Obama said, “we will end an outdated approach that, for decades, has failed to advance our interests, and instead we will begin to normalize relations between our two countries.”

A conundrum is a difficult or vexing problem that poses deep concern and yet has no “right” answer. The relationship between the United States and Cuba has been complex and fraught with confrontation: first with the aura of Spanish colonialism followed by American imperialism; then economic exploitation and authoritarian rule supported by the United States; and finally by the template of Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union following the Castro revolution in 1959, repeatedly re-energized by actions from either Havana or Washington over a span of decades. Letting go of this tumultuous history in order to move forward may prove difficult for both the United States and Cuba.

 

On the Problem of Diplomatic Recognition

What President Obama proposes is to put Cuban-U.S. relations on the road to something approaching diplomatic normalcy. And, therein rests the controversy . . . one that repeatedly arises in the diplomacy of the United States. Traditional diplomatic practice has been that diplomatic recognition is extended to any government that firmly establishes itself as in control of territory. Recognition, in other words, acknowledges political reality without regard to ideology. This can sometimes make for uncomfortable relations when states engage in “bad” behavior, but communication is deemed more important than approval.

There is, however, another school of diplomatic thought repeatedly, if inconsistently, practiced by American statecraft. Full recognition of a state is taken as a privilege accorded to states whose government is tolerated, if not fully approved of, by the United States. The corollary is that diplomatic recognition is withheld from states whose actions meet with disapproval. The United States, for example, withheld recognition from the Soviet Union until Franklin Roosevelt became president. Recognition was withheld from the People’s Republic of China until the Nixon/Kissinger initiative, and even then it was not until the Carter presidency that full recognition was extended. Today the United States denies full diplomatic recognition to Iran, North Korea and Cuba.

The underlying question is whether the denial of diplomatic recognition, often accompanied by economic sanctions, in any way encourages states to change unacceptable behaviors. One school of thought sees diplomatic recognition as a potential lever of influence over foreign governments. The more traditional school of thought sees diplomatic recognition as a necessary mode of formal relations that allows states more open avenues of communication, even if that communication is sometimes disapproving. It is precisely this debate that is being revisited in President Obama’s decision to extend diplomatic recognition to Cuba.

 

Obama’s Behind-the-Scenes Diplomacy

In announcing his decision to seek normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba — a diplomatic relationship that had been broken by President Eisenhower just before leaving office (January 3, 1961) — President Obama noted that over the last half century, “An ideological and economic barrier hardened between our two countries. Though [United States] policy has been rooted in the best of intentions,” the President insisted, “it has had little effect beyond providing the Cuban government with a rationale for restrictions on its people.” 

“It does not serve America’s interests, or the Cuban people, to try to push Cuba toward collapse,” President Obama concluded. “Even if that worked — and it hasn’t for 50 years — we know from hard-earned experience that countries are more likely to enjoy lasting transformation if their people are not subjected to chaos. We are calling on Cuba to unleash the potential of 11 million Cubans by ending unnecessary restrictions on their political, social and economic activities. In that spirit, we should not allow U.S. sanctions to add to the burden of Cuban citizens that we seek to help.”

President Obama went on to thank His Holiness Pope Francis for his efforts in promoting reconciliation between the United States and Cuba and to express thanks to the government of Canada for its use of diplomatic good offices to facilitate behind-the-scenes negotiation between the United States and Cuba. Though Obama did not mention Switzerland by name, it should also be noted that the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C., and the American Interests Section in Havana, essentially quasi-embassies functioning since 1977, operate under the “protective power” umbrella of Swiss diplomatic representation in those capitals.

The Vatican released a statement explaining the church’s background role, “The Holy Father wishes to express his warm congratulations for the historic decision taken by the Governments of the United States of America and Cuba to establish diplomatic relations, with the aim of overcoming, in the interest of the citizens of both countries, the difficulties which have marked their recent history.” The statement went on to note that Pope Francis had written to both President Raúl Castro and President Barack Obama inviting them “to initiate a new phase in relations between them.” Without offering detail, the Vatican statement also noted that it received delegations from the two countries in October 2014 and sought to “facilitate a constructive dialogue on delicate matters.”

Canada never followed the lead of the United States in breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba and has maintained a working relationship with Havana over the last 50 years. Sources close to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that Ottawa received a request from Washington in 2013 asking whether the Canadian government could facilitate a series of meetings that required “an incredible amount of discretion.” In the end, Canada hosted a series of seven meetings between Cuba and the United States in Ottawa and Toronto.  

Congratulating the two long-time adversaries on their “successful dialogue,” Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper noted that, “Canada was pleased to host senior officials from the United States, which permitted them the discretion required to carry these important talks. Canada supports a future for Cuba that fully embraces the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”

Raúl Castro’s Announcement

Though Cuban President Raúl Castro also thanked the Vatican and the Canadian government for their diplomatic efforts, he took a different approach to announcing the negotiations with the United States over the resumption of diplomatic relations. Where President Obama began by emphasizing the importance of this new diplomatic initiative, President Castro began with the much more immediate news that as part of the agreement to begin negotiations with the United States, it had been agreed that the U.S. would release three alleged Cuban spies held in American jails. In return, Cuba would release the American Alan Gross, a subcontractor for USAID convicted for “acts against the independence or the territorial integrity of the state" in March 2011, and an unnamed Cuban accused of being an agent of the United States tasked with subverting the Cuban regime, both of whom had long been held in Cuban jails. 

Only after his announcement of this prisoner exchange between the United States and Cuba did President Castro turn explicitly to the renewal of relations between the two countries. “This in no way means that the heart of the matter has been resolved,” Castro insisted. “The economic, commercial and financial blockade, which causes enormous human and economic damages to our country, must cease.” Still, President Castro ended his remarks on a positive note. “The progress made in our exchanges,” he observed, “proves that it is possible to find solutions to many problems.”

As if to legitimize his brother’s support for the move toward normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States, Fidel Castro issued a rare public statement that appeared to constitute a cautious endorsement of renewed formal relations with the United States. “I don't trust the policy of the United States nor have I had an exchange with them,” said the former Cuban president, “but this does not mean . . .  a rejection of a peaceful solution to conflicts or the dangers of war. We will always defend cooperation and friendship with all the peoples of the world, among them our political adversaries.”

Opposition to Obama’s Diplomatic Initiative

The possibility of re-establishing full diplomatic relations with Havana has encountered widespread public support, bipartisan political support in Congress and significant support from within the business community — including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Americas Society and the Council of the Americas (AS/COA). “Far from being a concession,” says Senior Director of Policy at the AS/COA  Christopher Sabatini, “better access to telecommunications equipment, improved contacts with U.S. citizens, and support to independent entrepreneurs will build the pockets of independence, which a half century of U.S.-ordered isolation and the Castro regime’s repression have prevented.”

Primary opposition to Obama’s new policy direction comes from leading voices of the Cuban-American community in Congress, several of whom have built their careers on the continued economic boycott of Cuba in the hope of bringing down the Castro regime. Chief among these voices is Senator Marco Rubio [R-FL], himself the child of Cuban exiles who immigrated to the United States in 1956. “This entire policy shift is based on an illusion, on a lie, the lie and the illusion that more commerce and access to money and goods will translate to political freedom for the Cuban people,” insisted Senator Rubio. “All this is going to do is give the Castro regime, which controls every aspect of Cuban life, the opportunity to manipulate these changes to perpetuate itself in power.”

It is Senator Rubio who leads Senate hearings on re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba. But his is hardly a lone voice. He is joined in opposition by another “child” of the Cuban diaspora and a leading Democratic voice, Senator Robert Menendez [D-NJ] who denounces what he calls the “fallacy that Cuba will reform just because the American president believes that if he extends his hand in peace, that the Castro brothers suddenly will unclench their fists.”

In the House of Representatives the leading voice of opposition comes from Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL27], a leader in the Cuban-American community and a former chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. She denounces President Obama’s proposal as an “overreach of executive authority” and an “irresponsible deal [that] does not hold the Castro regime accountable.”

Ros-Lehtinen offers perhaps the clearest and most pointed explanation of the opposition view regarding “Castro’s Cuba” and President Obama’s proposed shift in policy direction, “The fundamental recurring theme is that the Castro regime will not change their oppressive tactics and will not loosen their grip on the island. Mr. Obama’s recent announcement of plans to ease restrictions is kowtowing to the Castro brothers and gives them all the concessions on the regime’s wish list. It is our role as the world’s lone superpower to uphold democratic values and be the guardian of freedom everywhere, not only where it is convenient for the president’s legacy. Mr. Obama’s policy of dictator engagement has undermined the national security of the United States that sets a dangerous precedent that emboldens other desperate, sanctioned regimes.”

 

Significant Hurdles Ahead

While polls show that Americans harbor overwhelmingly negative views of Fidel Castro and the Castro regime, repeated polling by CNN and others suggests that roughly six in 10 Americans favor diplomatic relations with Cuba and nearly two-thirds want the travel restrictions to Cuba lifted. Just slightly more than half, the same polls suggest, want the economic embargo against Cuba lifted.

Opposition leaders from both parties in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and their counterparts in the House, which enters foreign affairs through its power of the purse as approval of both houses of Congress is needed to authorize government spending, continue to insist that they will pursue every avenue to cripple Obama's steps toward normalizing relations. They vow to oppose Obama’s ambassadorial nomination, to hold up funds for the embassy, to resist any attempts to close Guantánamo, to demand expanded support for Cuban opposition groups, to insist on outspoken criticism of the Castro regime’s human rights policies, and to demand full reparation for $6 billion owed to U.S. citizens and businesses for property confiscated at the time of the Cuban Revolution.

For his part, Cuban President Raúl Castro has introduced additional stringent conditions into the negotiations. In his speech to a summit of Latin American countries, he indicated that no rapprochement with the United States would make sense unless three conditions were met: (1) the lifting of the U.S. embargo on Cuba; (2) the return of the U.S. base at Guantánamo Bay; (3) compensation for “human and economic damage” the Cuban people have suffered. A fourth condition is the removal of Cuba from the State Department’s list of “state sponsors” of terrorism.

These countervailing agendas threaten to derail negotiations, which began with an initial session in Havana in January and will continue with a second round of negotiations — not yet scheduled at the time of this writing — in Washington. A measure of the commitment of both countries to the negotiating process is that the negotiating teams on both sides are led by top diplomatic experts on their respective countries. The U.S. delegation is led by Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson. General Director of the United States and North America Division of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs Josefina Vidal Ferreiro leads the Cuban delegation.

The initial negotiating session was described as “positive and productive” by Jacobson, but she also acknowledged that there were “profound differences” separating the two governments. Vidal noted that, “It was a first meeting. This is a process.” A measure of the delicacy of these negotiations appeared when Jacobson’s observation that, “We pressed the Cuban government for improved human rights conditions, including freedom of expression,” was mistakenly translated into Spanish as the United States “pressured” the Cuban government on the issue. Vidal immediately responded that, “Cuba has never responded to pressure.”

Despite significant support for normalization of relations in both countries, the opening of negotiations revealed the significant opposition both countries face at home. In the U.S., normalization immediately becomes enmeshed in presidential politics and faces significant opposition from Republican foreign policy hawks in the Congress, not to mention vocal opposition from some Cuban-American groups. In Cuba there is concern among Castro critics that the voices of political freedom will be stilled and among hardline Castro supporters that rapprochement with the United States will undo the socialist regime of the Fidelistas.

Recognizing the existence of this opposition on both sides, Assistant Secretary of State Jacobson ended her press conference after the initial negotiating session by noting that the establishment of full embassies in Havana and Washington would not by itself mean normalized ties between the two countries. “We have to overcome more than 50 years of a relationship that was not based on confidence or trust,” she reminded reporters. And so they do.